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The White Australia Policy, the British Empire, and the World
David C. Atkinson
In an editorial published during the Australian Commonwealth’s first federal election in
March 1901, the Sydney Morning Herald expressed support for the legislative exclusion of
Chinese, ‘Hindoos’, and ‘men of other Eastern races’ from the new dominion. Preventing largescale Asian immigration constituted one of federation’s prime motivations, after all, and inaction
augured only misery and ruin. ‘The experience of all countries shows the danger of unrestricted
coloured immigration’, the Herald’s editorialists opined, ‘and if we are to have “a white
Australia”, the Federal Parliament must devote its attention to the matter at an early stage’.1 At
the same time, however, the Herald editorialists also recognised the complex imperial and
international sensitivities inherent in Australian attempts to explicitly restrict Asian immigration.
The key point, expressed in a June 1901 editorial, was that ‘while we remain integral parts of the
Empire we cannot expect to be able to legislate freely against our fellow subjects or the subjects
of powerful and sensitive states’.2 The reference to ‘fellow subjects’ signified South Asians from
the Indian subcontinent, while the ‘subjects of powerful and sensitive states’ obliquely indicated
Japanese migrants from Britain’s increasingly important partner against Russian expansion in
East Asia. As the Herald’s conflicting—and indeed conflicted—editorials illustrate, the
implementation of Asian restriction in Australia entailed a practically intractable predicament.
On one hand federation afforded the opportunity to finally enact a consistent and well-defined
system of Asian exclusion and white citizenship across the entire Australian continent. On the
other hand, however, Australians remained constitutionally obligated to respect the priorities of
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British foreign and imperial policy, which in turn necessitated a sensitive and discreet
immigration policy.3
This article examines the essential imperial and international context of the 1901
Immigration Restriction Act, and argues that the foundational deliberations that produced the
White Australia Policy cannot be fully understood without attention to that global perspective.
Indeed, the real and potential implications of Asian restriction beyond the Australian continent
dominated the parliamentary debates and influenced the character and application of the policy
from the outset. The debate was not about whether to implement a restrictive immigration
regime, it was about how to implement that regime, a calculus suffused with a range of imperial
and international considerations. It hinged upon Labor Party leader John C. Watson’s popular
amendment, which scorned the Natal formula’s discretion and instead expressly excluded ‘any
person who is an aboriginal native of Asia, Africa, or of the islands thereof’. The question of
whether to risk embarrassing the British, Japanese, and Chinese governments by enacting open
and explicit restriction—as advocated by proponents of the Watson amendment—or whether to
disguise the legislation’s intent and spare Britain’s sensibilities along with the prestige of its
friends, colonies, and partners—as preferred by Edmund Barton’s Protectionist Ministry and the
Colonial and Foreign Offices in London—therefore guided the discussion. Ultimately, the
Barton government’s indulgence of the Natal formula was vigorously contested and the central
device at the core of the White Australia Policy—the notorious literacy test—was never a
foregone conclusion. This illustrates that while the White Australia Policy was a racialized act of
‘self-conscious nation building’, as John Fitzgerald argues, it was also a consciously and
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deliberately imperial and international act that imparted a distinctly global inflection to the
Australian nation building project at its inception.4
Existing studies of the White Australia Policy offer a mostly cursory discussion of the
extent to which members of the first Commonwealth Parliament purposefully framed and
vigorously debated their actions in the wider global context of British imperial and foreign
policy. That indispensable context is often simply asserted rather than unraveled and analyzed.
The influence of Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain and his favored Natal formula is well
known, but the fact that Commonwealth legislators adopted this policy only after a turbulent
debate has received much less scholarly attention. That character of that debate is important
because it reveals the extent to which imperial and international concerns influenced Australian
legislators as they enacted Asian immigration restriction in 1901.
Histories of the White Australia Policy’s institution—from the first studies by Myra
Willard, A.T. Yarwood, and H.I. London, to later contributions by James Jupp and Keith
Windschuttle—tend to only allude to the Immigration Restriction Bill’s global connotations.
Much of the analysis instead focuses on legislators’ domestic rationales and motivations.5
Willard barely acknowledges the broader imperial and international content or contentiousness
of the debates in her important early account. Yarwood likewise offers a short but useful
overview of Japanese intercessions during the deliberations, yet his discussion of the actual
debates remains focused upon the Immigration Restriction Bill’s racial and economic
dimensions. He even goes so far as to suggest that the White Australia Policy actually limited
international discord by ‘preventing the growth of minorities whose presence might have led to
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recurring diplomatic crises’. Similarly, H.I. London’s brief overview of the legislation’s
development recognizes the later diplomatic burdens engendered by the White Australia fantasy,
but presents them as largely a feature of the post-Second World War era.6 Contrary to the
assertions of Yarwood and London, the White Australia Policy in fact constituted a diplomatic
millstone for both Australia and Great Britain from its inception in 1901, as the formative
debates examined in this article reveal.
The White Australia Policy’s broader global context not surprisingly receives more
attention in recent explicitly transnational studies by scholars such as Robert Huttenback,
Andrew Markus, Adam McKeown, and Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds. Yet even these
avowedly global accounts largely just allude to the international scope and character of the 1901
debates without analyzing their content and consequences. Lake and Reynolds offer a brief
overview of the issues raised by legislators, diplomats, and imperial officials during those
formative deliberations, but they do not dwell on the full scope and nuance of the discussions.
The same can be said of Huttenback’s earlier history of discriminatory immigration policies in
the British settler colonies, which barely addresses the seminal Australian debate at all, while
McKeown’s otherwise comprehensive global history of Chinese migration controls does not
scrutinize the Australian deliberations at all.7 Much of the other recent scholarship on Asian
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immigration is concerned with recovering the agency, experiences, and communities of the
migrants themselves, rather than the policies that attempted to constrain migrant mobility and
engagement with Australian society.8
Never simply a question of internal policy, debates over the White Australia policy’s
implementation in 1901 illustrate the complex and deeply antagonistic imperial and international
politics engendered by the Australian Commonwealth’s Asian restriction regime. As the
enormous new federation heaved itself into the twentieth century, Australians entered a tentative
political space between colony and nation; self-governing in domestic matters but beholden to
British authority in imperial and foreign affairs. This enduring ambiguity made one of
federation’s most urgent objectives—continental immigration control—difficult to achieve. The
new Commonwealth was bound to an international and imperial system directed by Great Britain
and subject to the imperatives of British foreign and imperial policy. The ongoing issue of Asian
migration also ensured Australians’ continued global engagement, whether they liked it or not.
As the Sydney Morning Herald melodramatically opined on federation day, ‘there are many
millions of coloured fellow-subjects of our own in India, Japan is looking for an outlet for its
surplus population by emigration, and the Chinese question is always more or less with us’.9 By
subjecting the formative parliamentary debates to a sustained analysis that is largely absent from
existing accounts—and by supplementing those debates with contemporary diplomatic and
imperial correspondence from the Australian and British archives—this article reveals the full
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depth and extent to which global considerations influenced the White Australia Policy at its
moment of genesis.

The Origins of the White Australia Policy and the Natal Formula
White colonists had pursued Asian exclusion measures ever since Chinese labourers first
arrived on the goldfields of New South Wales and Victoria in the 1850s. Throughout the latter
decades of the nineteenth-century, anti-Asian activists projected an array of racial, economic,
cultural, and strategic anxieties onto Asian migrants, whom they imagined would deluge and
overwhelm the sparsely populated southern continent. Victorian legislators acted first in 1855,
implementing a head tax on Chinese entering the colony and imposing limits on the number of
Chinese that could legally be carried by each arriving vessel. The parliaments of South Australia
and New South Wales enacted similar provisions in 1857 and 1861 respectively. Attempts at
comprehensive exclusion nevertheless faltered during the colonial era in the absence of a
continent-wide policy. Prospective immigrants circumvented individual colonies’ restrictions by
entering at unrestricted ports elsewhere.10 It would be almost three decades before Australian
colonists finally cooperated on a continent-wide system of restriction.11
The British government immediately intervened once it became clear that colonial
legislators were determined to collaboratively implement harsh restrictions upon Chinese
immigration in 1888. Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Knutsford, admitted the colonists’
right to control their domestic affairs, but he also encouraged them to approach restriction with
respect for British diplomatic and imperial sensitivities. Most importantly, he urged that colonial
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governments should avoid explicitly excluding Chinese immigration on the basis of race, since
this was bound to offend the Qing government and its people.12 This remained the imperial
government’s steadfast position in the years that followed whenever the subject of Asian
restriction arose.
By the end of the nineteenth century, Chinese migrants confronted pervasive limitations
on their immigration, settlement, and employment in Australia (and elsewhere in the British
Empire).13 Not content with simply excluding China’s millions, however, defenders of
Australian whiteness now turned their attention to a supposedly greater alien threat. Colonial
leaders concluded that innumerable Japanese and Indian migrants also craved entry and they
urged legislative action to stem this potentially overwhelming tide. The imperial and
international consequences of expanding immigration restrictions to encompass Japanese and
Indian labourers proved extremely challenging. From the imperial perspective, the Indian
Viceroy in Calcutta, the India and Colonial Offices in London, and Indian immigrants
themselves all interceded against colonial discrimination policies. Diplomatically, the Japanese
Foreign Ministry and its consuls in the major Australian cities and towns joined the British
Foreign Office and Colonial Office in urging restraint.
The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, famously attempted to
ameliorate these growing tensions at the1897 Conference of Colonial Premiers in London by
advocating the adoption of the so-called Natal formula. That subterfuge—based on a policy
enacted by the government of Natal earlier that year—eschewed explicit racial exclusion,
ostensibly assuaging British, Indian, Japanese, and Chinese objections. The Natal test instead
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forced prospective immigrants—regardless of race—to transcribe a passage in English.
Immigration officials adjudicated the potential immigrant’s language facility and could therefore
surreptitiously exclude Asians on educational rather than racial grounds.14 Chamberlain’s
compromise mitigated the most tactless insensitivities of colonial prejudice, but Australian
legislators only reluctantly incorporated the Natal formula into their expanded immigration
restriction regime in 1901 as the following discussion demonstrates. They did so under duress
from British, Japanese, and Indian representatives.
When federation finally came, the overwhelming majority of Australia’s first parliament
agreed with Barton that Asian immigration must be subject to restriction, and that support cut
across every social, political, and economic affiliation. The question hinged upon how to
implement that restriction, and it was here that partisan loyalties took some unexpected twists.
The first parliament saw Barton’s Protectionist Party in a governing coalition with J.C. Watson’s
Labor Party. Free Traders—largely pro-business representatives—stood in practical opposition,
led by George Reid. Barton’s Protectionist-Labor coalition nevertheless cleaved immediately on
the question of support for the Natal formula. The prime minister’s fellow Protectionists lined up
in favor of the Natal formula with only two exceptions, while Labor M.P.s voted unanimously
for their leader’s amendment. It would be left to Free Traders, who were almost evenly split, to
cast the deciding ballots.15

The Natal Formula versus Explicit Racial Exclusion
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Arguments over the potential imperial and international implications of Asian
immigration restriction saturated and framed the debate over enacting the White Australia Policy
in late 1901. Explicit and forthright exclusion based upon race—a strategy favored by a
considerable number of legislators—threatened to strain Australia’s relationship with Great
Britain. Imperial authorities in London, Calcutta, and elsewhere could not countenance outright
racist regulations against subjects of Britain’s larger (and largely non-white) empire, nor would
the British Foreign Office tolerate slights against subjects of British allies and partners abroad.
And yet there were those in the Australian Parliament who believed that any prevarication on the
subject of Asian exclusion promised only disaster for the Commonwealth and its status as a selfgoverning colony founded upon bedrock principles of white political and economic citizenship.
A strong British Empire, they claimed, would not benefit from a racially heterogeneous
Australia. From its inception, then, the White Australia Policy was a source of contention and
anxiety not only in Australian politics, but also in British imperial and international politics.
These contrasting realities stood at the crux of most of the arguments over the Immigration
Restriction Bill, and manifested in a choice between two competing forms of restriction: the
imperial government’s preferred Natal formula, and the Australian Labor Party leadership’s
proposed amendment that outlawed Asian immigration on explicit racial grounds.
Barton introduced the Immigration Restriction Bill on August 7, 1901, and he was candid
about its intent. From a practical point of view parliament had to consolidate the six prefederation colonies’ immigration policies into one central act. Just as importantly, Barton
emphasized the supposed racial threat that unrestricted Asian immigration posed to the newly
federated Commonwealth. Quoting from Charles H. Pearson’s 1893 book National Life and
Character, Barton proclaimed that ‘we are guarding the last part of the world in which the higher
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races can live and increase freely for the higher civilization’. According to Pearson, the dominant
white races would eventually face an unassailable racial, economic, and diplomatic challenge
from nonwhites, whereupon whites would ‘wake to find ourselves elbowed and hustled, and
perhaps even thrust aside by peoples whom we looked down upon as servile, and thought of as
bound always to minister to our needs’.16 From Barton’s perspective, then, this was the broader
challenge that white Australians were destined to meet, not only on behalf of the
Commonwealth’s future generations but also for the welfare of the world’s white races.17
Barton nevertheless committed his government to Chamberlain’s Natal formula despite
these unambiguous principles. He did so in deference to Britain’s global interests. If legislators
imposed an explicit proscription method in defiance of Britain’s myriad relationships throughout
the empire and around the world, he argued, then imperial authorities would simply refuse to
grant their assent. International and imperial opposition was assured, Barton affirmed, ‘the
moment we begin to say that every one of a certain nationality or colour shall be restricted’.18 In
particular, he believed that Australians should not ‘make discriminations which will complicate
the foreign relations of the Empire’. Barton nevertheless reassured his colleagues that his
government would reinforce the act if the literacy test proved ineffective.19
Many legislators nevertheless rejected this indirect approach and instead endorsed the
explicit legislative exclusion of Asian immigrants regardless of the potential imperial and
international complications. The opposition coalesced around an amendment proposed by
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Labour Party leader John C. Watson. Watson’s amendment scorned the Natal formula’s
discretion and instead expressly excluded ‘any person who is an aboriginal native of Asia,
Africa, or of the islands thereof’. According to its many supporters, this direct strategy
eliminated any doubt as to the legislation’s intended targets and provided an unyielding
safeguard against unwanted immigrants.

The Immigration Restriction Bill and Imperial Politics
The choice between the Natal formula’s deception and the Watson amendment’s
forthright exclusion dominated the rest of the parliamentary debates, and pitted consideration for
Britain’s imperial and international obligations against the purported racial purity of the new
Australian Commonwealth. It was difficult for advocates of the Watson amendment to justify
disdain for the imperatives and responsibilities of British imperial politics. Some of them tried
anyway. Indeed, proponents of Watson’s impolitic amendment made a number of strenuous
arguments in favor of jettisoning the Natal formula, even in defiance of the British government’s
imperial obligations.
During the debate’s first speech on September 6, 1901, the deputy leader of the Free
Trade Party, Sir William McMillan, denounced the Barton Ministry’s embrace of Chamberlain’s
literacy test as ‘an absolute fraud’ and vigorously defended the Watson amendment’s candor. It
was in the empire’s interests to unequivocally protect Australian whiteness given the exposed
position of the Dominion in the southern reaches of the Pacific Ocean:
I hold that if we are perfectly sure that a certain policy is necessary to uphold the
purity of the race in Australia…I do not think we should hesitate, for one moment,
under the peculiar circumstances of the case—with our position in these southeastern seas, open to millions of these servile and alien people—to say to Great
Britain, “This is a problem which you and we have to face, and the more honestly
we face it the better for the future”.20
20
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McMillan resented his government’s equivocation on ‘a matter of life and death to the purity of
our race and the future of our nation’. According to McMillan, Great Britain would simply have
to recognize the magnitude of the racial threats facing their southern dominion.21 Although a
member of Barton’s Protectionist Party, Samuel Mauger also supported the Watson amendment
and race loomed large in his rationale. He accepted that fears of economic competition were
justified, but his primary concern was ‘the possibility and probability of racial contamination’.
Moreover, he contended that the British government’s objections on imperial grounds were
misplaced. Constitutionally, Indians were merely subjects in contrast to Australians who were
also citizens, he argued.22 This presumably circumscribed the rights of Indians to protest their
treatment.
Many Members of Parliament in fact doubted that Great Britain would actually veto
legislation that prohibited non-white immigration outright. They had to know that a white
Australia was exponentially more valuable to the empire than a continent overwhelmed by
surplus Asian labor. Another Protectionist representative, James Hume Cook, for example,
demanded ‘for the safety of the Australian nation, for the good of her national life, we require
that Australia shall be white. Do honorable members think that Great Britain does not recognize
our aspirations in this regard, and that she will not grant us what we want?’ From his perspective
parliament could safely adopt the Watson amendment without fear of British retribution as long
as they stated their case firmly and unambiguously. After all, Australians themselves were best
‘able to appreciate the danger of these vast hordes.’23
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The Labor Party’s King O’Malley also opposed the Natal formula and supported explicit
exclusion. O’Malley believed the Natal formula would inevitably fail and the problem would
emerge with greater ferocity in the future. The proposed dictation test merely postponed
settlement of the issue. He echoed Barton’s claim of Australian exceptionalism, adding God’s
imprimatur to the Commonwealth’s racial mission: ‘we are here upon a continent set apart by the
Creator exclusively for a Southern empire—for a Southern nation—and it is our duty to preserve
this island continent for all eternity to the white race, irrespective of where they may come
from.’24 American by birth, O’Malley brought a unique perspective to the debate. He drew a
direct analogy between Australia’s potential racial future and what he imagined constituted the
United States’ actual racial past:
If the Australian people had only lived in the Southern states of America—as I
have—and had seen the dire results of the present mingling of the Africans with the
whites, they would put their feet down and say—“We are going to profit by the
terrible mistake of the American people, and we are not going to leave it to posterity
to solve such an unholy problem”.
In fact, for many Australian officials the Immigration Restriction Act represented the
newly-constituted Commonwealth’s sole guarantee of national survival and by implication its
continued benefit to the empire. As debate raged in Parliament, for example, Queensland’s
Agent-General in London, Sir Horace Tozer, insisted that Japanese immigration represented a
dire threat to Australia’s continued existence as a British colony. While recognizing the
immigration question’s economic aspects, Tozer also claimed that ‘in their military schools the
Japanese make no secret of their ultimate aims to acquire territory in Australia.’ The White
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Australia policy had profound significance, therefore, since ‘the policy of Australia to prevent
them getting a foothold sufficient to assist their plans of conquest is of national importance.’25
Despite this intensifying cross-party chorus, a slender majority of legislators opposed the
audacity of the Watson amendment and decried their colleagues’ flippancy toward British
imperial interests. Free Trade Party M.P. William Knox, for example, supported the Natal
formula even though he admitted the magnitude of the ‘Yellow Danger’. But this was all the
more reason to heed the imperial government’s interests. Australia was defenseless against the
covetous intrigues of her Asian neighbors without the Royal Navy’s protection: ‘where, in the
name of all that is good and true, should we be in the face of these menaces at our northern
shores, if we had not the British Government to fall back on?’26 Discounting Britain’s request for
moderation would invite tragedy, Knox counseled, assuring the very calamity that Australians
most feared.
Fellow Free Trader Frederick William Piesse also rejected the Watson amendment while
still invoking a racial motivation for the Natal formula. Piesse eschewed his colleague’s typical
evocation of American racial strife and instead cited an imperial analogy. Australia was presently
at war with the South African Boers, he observed, who were at one time ‘the best and purest
stock of European people’. This once pure race was now degraded, however, because they had
‘associated with an inferior people’. By virtue of living near black Africans, he reasoned, the
formerly unadulterated Dutch Huguenots had vitiated their racial vitality. Here was another clear
example, Piesse argued, of a white race polluted by its proximity to a savage and uncultured
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people. White Australians could not afford a similar fate. The issue was therefore too urgent to
delay passage of the government’s legislation by risking British reservation.27
Despite widespread support, the Watson amendment was narrowly defeated by a 36-31
vote. The British government expressed satisfaction following the amendment’s rejection and the
Natal formula’s triumph, despite the rancor that filled the Australian Hansard. The Colonial
Office needed no reminder of how vitriolic the debate had been. As the Australian GovernorGeneral, Lord Hopetoun, informed the Colonial Office ‘the feeling in Australia…is so intense
that I cannot blame my Government for having introduced a measure of this kind.’28 And yet
imperial authorities felt vindicated. Evidence of Chamberlain’s complicity in this unfolding
masquerade can be found in his response to a petition, sent to the Colonial Office on behalf of
Victoria’s Indian residents in the autumn of 1901. The petitioners expressed bewilderment at the
British government’s tacit approval of the immigration restriction bill, then still under debate in
the Australian parliament. ‘We cannot understand how it is that our own Government now wish
to separate us from herself and to put us as strangers along with the outside nations of the world’,
they wrote, ‘especially as it is very painful for us to be put along with the Chinese, who are a
defeated and dying race’. They reminded Chamberlain of India’s great sacrifices in defense of
the empire. Indians had demonstrated their willingness ‘to give their blood wherever the British
Government has asked for water’. Their petition provides a rare glimpse into this debate’s effect
on Australia’s small Indian community:
We are therefore greatly pained that there is so much talk about a white Australia.
Is it our fault that the almighty God made us of dark-coloured skin, and are we (who
are part of the Empire) to be cast off and put along with the Chinese and Japanese,
27
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whilst there is no mention made of the Germans, Russians, French, Italians, or
members of other outside nations? Have the outside nations given and done more
for the British people than we have given and done? Do the members of Parliament
consider the justice of this side of the question?29
Chamberlain offered a disingenuous response. He instructed the Australian Governor
General to convey his appreciation of their concerns. At the same time, however, he stated the
British government’s opinion that the Immigration Restriction bill ‘does not appear to cast any
reflection upon any class of His Majesty’s subjects.’30 Australia’s desultory acquiescence in the
Natal formula had successfully limited British liability. The Australian government was equally
deceitful in its response to the petitioners. In their view, a careful reading of the bill’s provisions
would demonstrate that ‘it contains nothing which couples the Indian with the Chinese races, and
that consequently there is no reason for pain on that score.’31 A cursory reading of the
parliamentary debates revealed otherwise.

The Immigration Restriction Bill and International Politics
Even as the newly-elected legislators of Australia’s first parliament cast the
Commonwealth’s immigration restriction regime in this imperial context, they were also
cognizant of the broader international implications of their actions. Two issues framed the
broader diplomatic debate on the Immigration Restriction Bill. Great Britain’s relations with
Japan loomed largest. If Australians insisted upon pursuing their white continental fantasy, it
would have to do so at the expense of Japanese prestige. In addition, there were obvious
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ramifications for Australians’ nascent relations with Japan. These two issues were closely related
given Australia’s status as a British dominion whose foreign relations were administered by the
imperial government, and Australians knew it. As future Australian Prime Minister William
Morris Hughes declared during the debates, ‘we want a white Australia, and are we to be denied
it because we shall offend the Japanese or embarrass His Majesty’s Ministers? I think not.’ 32
The Japanese government presented its case against the proposed immigration restriction
bill before the legislative debates even began. The Japanese Consul in Sydney, H. Eitaki, was a
constant antagonist of the Barton Ministry on immigration matters and a keen observer of
parliamentary proceedings. Eitaki raised the issue with Barton in May 1901, stating the Japanese
case against the anticipated legislation. Eitaki immediately challenged Australian racial
assumptions with some of his own:
The Japanese belong to an Empire whose standard of civilization is so much higher
than that of Kanakas, Negroes, Pacific Islanders, Indians, or other Eastern peoples,
that to refer to them in the same terms cannot but be regarded in the light of a
reproach, which is hardly warranted by the fact of the shade of the national
complexion.
He further dismissed the widely held Australian conviction that Japan sought an outlet for its
surplus population. Eitaki hoped, therefore, that Barton would exempt Japanese immigrants from
the proposed bill.33 In June 1901, Eitaki received the Japanese Minister’s support in London,
who lobbied the British Foreign Office to ‘advise the Federal Government either to give up the
presentation of such a bill or to eliminate therefrom [sic] the provisions unfair to Japanese
subjects.’34
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The Japanese government’s appeals did not resonate in the Australian Parliament, but not
because legislators did not understand their actions’ international implications. In fact, Australian
legislators demonstrated a keen understanding of Asian restriction’s potential diplomatic
complications. Regarding Anglo-Japanese relations and Australian-Japanese relations, Patrick
Glynn of South Australia—a future minister of external affairs—neatly summed up the question:
‘[Chamberlain] does not wish to offend Japanese susceptibilities by raising the colour question;
but the question is whether we are to subordinate our undoubted desire to prevent coloured
immigrants from coming into Australia to the exigencies of Empire.’35 Not only did Glynn favor
the Watson amendment’s explicit and direct approach, he also felt that Britain would accept it.
Independent Labor member James Wilkinson was equally blunt in his judgment. ‘Are we afraid
of offending Japan?’ he asked, ‘shall we put our fear of offending Japan above our desire to have
a pure Australian race comprised of the best-blood of Europe, which has made the British race
what it is to-day?’ Wilkinson did not believe Australians should place British and Japanese
sensibilities above that cherished racial objective.36
Attorney General Alfred Deakin nevertheless gave one of the most impassioned speeches
in support of the government’s legislation and against the Watson amendment on international
grounds. He admitted that parliament was unquestionably engaged in establishing a policy of
world-historical significance. Furthermore, there was no question that Australia was to be a
white man’s country, and Deakin was confident that ‘at the very first instant of our national
career we are as one for a white Australia.’ That policy, he declared, was to be ‘the Monroe
Doctrine of the Commonwealth of Australia.’37 President James Monroe’s 1823 declaration
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warned Europe’s imperial powers to respect the western hemisphere’s independence. Australians
were now claiming racial suzerainty over an entire continent. International observers had derided
the former policy upon its promulgation in 1823, Deakin reminded his colleagues, yet eighty
years later it was diplomatic orthodoxy. Australia’s equally pretentious claims would meet with
international ridicule, Deakin conceded. European observers would likely watch with
amazement when they regard what appears to be the arrogance of a handful of white
men, most of them clustered on the eastern littoral of this immense continent,
adopted before they have effectively occupied a quarter of the continent, and with
the great bulk of its immense extent little more than explored or with a sparse
European settlement.38
Nevertheless, Deakin counseled consideration of Japan’s national pride and effusively
praised Japan’s recent economic, political, and military development. He insisted that it was the
Japanese migrant’s capacity for education, industriousness, and thrift that made them undesirable
in Australia, since they threatened to displace white workers who demanded higher wages and
better conditions. Deakin left no doubt that they ought to be excluded, but he was adamant that
their exclusion had to be handled sensitively. ‘When it becomes necessary for us to exclude
people like the Japanese’, he warned, ‘it is reasonable that we should exclude them in the most
considerate manner possible, and without conveying any idea that we have confused them with
the many uneducated savages who visit our shores.’ Deakin was aware that Japanese
representatives like Eitaki were scrutinising the parliamentary debates. He was therefore eager to
appease Japanese pride, recognizing that ‘to lump all these peoples together as Asiatics and
undesirables would naturally be offensive to a high-spirited people like the Japanese.’39 The
adoption of the Natal formula and rejection of the tactless Watson amendment constituted the
only way to avoid injury to Japan and to ensure Australia’s future as a white continent.

38
39

Ibid., Volume IV, 12 September, 1901, p. 4806.
Ibid., p. 4812.

20
Supporting Barton and Deakin’s position, fellow Protectionist party member James
McCay succinctly articulated the Commonwealth’s predicament. It was precisely because of
British support that Australia could even contemplate offending Japan and without that support
nobody would dare unnecessarily antagonise the Japanese. With that in mind, he suggested,
legislators should be mindful of British objections. After all, McCay astutely observed, ‘if we
wish to enjoy the benefits of the [imperial] connexion we must also share its burdens.’ Among
those burdens was respect for Britain’s global relationships. Richmond’s Thomas Ewing
concurred. His support for the government’s position was simple: ‘I stand by the Empire,
because surrounded as Australia is by hundreds of millions of yellow men, she is powerless to
play a lone hand. Without the protection of Great Britain she would be absolutely submerged and
destroyed.’40 Those flippant advocates of explicit prohibitions needed to accept this stark but
pressing reality.
One of the most passionate speeches supporting the government’s position came from
future Chief Justice and Governor-General, Isaac Isaacs. Personally, Isaacs favored the Watson
amendment’s direct approach. His commitment to a white Australia was beyond reproach and he
was eager ‘to insure that Australia shall be white, and that we shall be free for all time from the
contamination and the degrading influence of inferior races’. Nature had drawn the color line and
the stakes, Isaacs argued, could not be higher:
I recognise to the fullest that here in Australia we have a white man’s war. It is a
struggle for life; it is a struggle for that higher and fuller life that all progressive
nations must feel and share in. It is that struggle for victory over adverse
circumstances which is the pride and glory of all advancing civilizations. It is a
white man’s war that we must face, and I would not suffer any black or tinted man
to come in and block the path to progress. I would resist to the utmost, if it were
necessary, any murky stream from disturbing the current of Australian life.41
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Nevertheless, he was sensitive to the imperial and international issues surrounding the question
and he therefore supported the government’s position. Instead of the Watson amendment, he
favored appending an emergency provision to the government’s bill empowering parliament to
act if the literacy test proved inadequate. His amendment failed.
The irascible Labor Party firebrand Billy Hughes was less diplomatic. Without
acknowledging Australia’s own strategic dependence on the home government, Hughes mocked
British opposition to the White Australia policy as selfishly strategic: ‘it is notorious that to-day
Great Britain stands almost without an ally. She is now driven into a corner, and she is dependent
upon the support, tardy and reluctant, of Japan.’42 Australians should not sacrifice their recently
earned—albeit still circumscribed—autonomy because of British strategic concerns. ‘We object
to these people because of their vices, and of their immorality, and because of a hundred things
which we can only hint at’, Hughes pronounced, ‘and our objections are not to be met by the
declaration that the Imperial Government will be embarrassed by them.’43 King O’Malley was
similarly disposed to dispense with diplomatic niceties. ‘Is it proper’, he asked, ‘that the rights of
the Australian people should be sacrificed on the altar of foreign compromise?’ The issue was
simple: ‘the Asiatic immigrant is nothing more or less than a coffee-coloured, copper-headed
viper in the bosom of the Commonwealth, and if we do not kill that viper, that viper will kill us.’
He would vote for the Watson amendment regardless of the international and imperial
consequences.44
Fellow Laborite James Fowler proposed another, much subtler approach in support of the
Watson amendment. The White Australia policy did not imply Australian racial superiority or
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Japanese inferiority. It simply recognized differences in national character and a desire to
preserve Australia’s British heritage. This was an impulse common to all nations, Fowler
insisted, and he felt confident that Japan would recognize this position. After all, he supposed, ‘if
the Japanese were threatened with an influx of foreign people in any such numbers as we in
Australia are threatened with, they would no doubt feel thoroughly justified in taking the
measures which we are about to adopt.’45
Tasmania’s Norman Cameron—one of a small minority who opposed the White
Australia policy irrespective of methods—understood the friction inherent in this ill-conceived
declaration of continental whiteness. He highlighted the international considerations of alienating
both Britain and Japan in one, ill-conceived, legislative assault. It was a distraction, he argued,
from the real threat: ‘why should we who are British do anything to cause a feeling of animosity
or distrust to arise in the minds of the people of these two races who are our natural friends
against our enemy, Russia?’46 Another outright opponent of the legislation, Bruce Smith of
Parkes, even challenged the premise that Asian immigration represented a threat to Australia:
‘the public have been told over and over again that the purity and whiteness of the Australian
Commonwealth is being endangered by the incursion of these hordes of Asiatics. I say that it is a
fable; that it is altogether a fairy story.’47 With faint praise, he deftly captured the absurdity of
parliament’s position: ‘I think it is a humiliating confession to go forth to the world from one in
so high a position that the truth is that we are afraid to come into contact and competition with a
race like the Japanese.’48 Such comparatively progressive statements were hardly calculated to
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assuage Japanese sensitivity and his colleagues rarely reciprocated his confidence in white
Australians’ racial vigor.
Australians, it turned out, did not have a voice in the matter. Indeed, Cameron and
Hughes had astutely anticipated Britain’s strategic dilemmas, inadvertently predicting one of the
early twentieth-century’s most shocking diplomatic developments. Unbeknownst to Australian
legislators, throughout their deliberations British officials were secretly negotiating an alliance
with Japan.49 The alliance was designed to neutralize Russian expansion in Asia, of which both
parties were increasingly suspicious. Informal negotiations between Britain and Japan began in
April 1901, and formal negotiations commenced that October.50 According to Ian Nish, however,
‘it cannot be said that the Australian immigration crises in 1901 played any great part in
modifying or delaying the alliance.’ The alliance was simply too valuable to the Japanese.51
Nevertheless, the Japanese Consul and the Japanese minister in London continued their
exertions against discrimination. Predictably, Eitaki remained especially concerned by the
Watson amendment but the proposed language change also troubled him. ‘The English test’, he
reminded Barton ‘was regarded as courteous to Japan, inasmuch as it placed her on an equal
footing with other nations’, The proposed change to ‘any European language’, however, was not:
I cannot imagine any sufficient reason why the Japanese language should not be
regarded as upon the same footing with, say, the Turkish, the Russian, the Greek,
the Polish, the Norwegian, the Austrian, or the Portuguese, or why, if an immigrant
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of any of the nationalities I have mentioned may be examined in his own language,
the same courtesy should not be extended to a Japanese.52
Unable to elicit a satisfactory response from Barton, Eitaki turned to the GovernorGeneral. The substitution of European for English was ‘racial, pure and simple’ he protested.53
The Japanese Minister in London made similar representations to the British Foreign Office.54
Eitaki kept his Foreign Ministry apprised of parliamentary debates, and Ambassador Hayashi
was equally distressed by the proceedings’ tone. As he complained to the British Foreign Office,
Australian legislators ‘explain that the measure imposes an educational qualification without
distinction of race or colour’, yet at the same time ‘they couple it with such monstrous
declarations’.55 Nevertheless, in correspondence with the Foreign Office Chamberlain once again
expressed his view that the European language stipulation wholly comported with the Natal
formula. As such he could not interfere with Australia’s legislation.56 As Chamberlain speciously
told the Foreign Office, ‘[Hayashi] must take account of the words of the Bill itself, not of words
uttered during debate which have no binding force whatsoever.’57 In particular, Chamberlain was
reportedly concerned that if Britain disallowed the bill, ‘the only result would be the passage of
an even more drastic measure, framed with less consideration for the feelings of Japan, and
possibly containing a direct prohibition of the entry of Japanese into Australia.’58

Eitaki to Edmund Barton, 16 September, 1901, pp. 1-2; NAA: A8, 1901/203/1, ‘Correspondence with H. Eitaki;
Acting Consul General for Japan, with reference to the Immigration Restriction Act, and admission of Japanese
Subjects’.
53
Eitaki to the Earl of Hopetoun, 5 October, 1901. Ibid.
54
Baron Hayashi to the Marquess of Lansdowne, 7 October, 1901. Ibid.
55
Hayashi to the Marquess of Lansdowne, 16 December, 1901. TNA: FO 46/548, p. 444.
56
H. Bertram Cox to the Foreign Office, 18 October, 1901. NAA: A8, 1901/203/1.
57
Bertram Cox to the Foreign Office, 4 January, 1902. TNA: FO 46/670, Foreign Office: Political and Other
Departments: General Correspondence before 1906, Japan, Immigration of Japanese into British Colonies, 19021905, p. 2.
58
The Self-Governing Dominions and Coloured Immigration, Sir Charles Prestwood Lucas, July 1908. TNA; CO
886/1/1, p. 31.
52

25
It was left to the British Foreign Secretary, the Marquess of Lansdowne, to inform
Hayashi that his government could not intercede with Australia on Japan’s behalf. Based on an
earlier argument articulated by Chamberlain, Lansdowne notified the Japanese Minister that the
Immigration Restriction Act ‘contains no sign of any discrimination and is essentially the same
as the Natal Immigration Restriction Act, which the Japanese Government suggested as a model
for Australian legislation’. Despite the many clear pronunciations to the contrary in parliament,
Lansdowne was compelled to dismiss Japanese concerns.59
This did not prevent Japanese representatives from challenging the White Australia
policy. It was especially clear to Eitaki and Hayashi that Australia’s reluctant embrace of the
Natal formula was nothing more than a facade. As Eitaki complained to Barton in 1902:
it is difficult indeed to understand, in the face of the existence of an Act whose test
Clause provides for an examination ‘in a European language’, and whose passage
was assisted (if not absolutely secured) by declarations from responsible Ministers
that it was directly aimed at the Japanese, and would not be applied to white
residents of European countries, how anyone can claim there is no discrimination
against Japanese subjects in any Australian legislation.60
Sir Claude MacDonald, who replaced Ernest Satow as British Minister to Japan in 1900, also
relayed Hayashi’s continued protests to the Foreign Office in London. The Japanese government,
MacDonald related, ‘had at one time been ready to accept the basis of the Natal regulations’.
They now recognized, however, that ‘the educational test was likely to be used in such a manner
as to discriminate against Japanese immigrants.’61 Japan would continue its protests without
significant success in the ensuing decades.
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Conclusion
The White Australia policy constituted a wellspring of imperial and international tensions
from its inception. Enshrined in the 1901 Immigration Restriction Act, Australian legislators
designed this policy to restrict Asian immigration into their continental Commonwealth through
the artifice of a literacy test based on the Natal government’s 1897 ruse. The debates surrounding
the act’s establishment nevertheless reveal that Australian representatives understood their
legislation’s potentially disruptive imperial and international consequences. While most
lawmakers supported Asian exclusion, they were deeply divided over how to achieve that goal.
Many representatives rejected the Australian, British, and Japanese government’s calls for
restraint and advocated the explicit exclusion approach of the Watson Amendment, while others
preferred to mitigate possible international friction by accepting the Natal formula.
This legislative sleight of hand ultimately ameliorated Australian legislators’ most
egregious impulses, but the White Australia Policy nevertheless ensnared Australia and Great
Britain in a complex global drama that illustrates the entangled early-twentieth century politics
of race, empire, and international relations. Australian acceptance of the Natal formula—and
British acquiescence to the Immigration Restriction Act—in December 1901 did not resolve the
issue of racially motivated immigration restriction in Australia or within the wider British
Empire. Rather, it heralded the beginning of a prolonged imperial and international dispute
concerning Asian immigrants’ rights in the British colonies of settlement.62 Australians, after all,
were not alone in legislating against Asian immigration. Canada, New Zealand, and Natal all
enacted similar legislation during this period. The Immigration Restriction Act may have
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provided ‘a stone wall against the danger of race pollution’, as the Sydney Morning Herald
hoped it would in September 1901, but it did not submerge the imperial and diplomatic tensions
that afflicted it from the outset.63
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